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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner,
v.

: Case No. 20030667-SC
:
Ct. of Appeals No. 20020343-CA

LISA VICTORIA CORWELL,
Defendant-Respondent.

:
:
BRIEF OF PETITIONER

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in State
v. Corwell, 2003 UT App 261, 74 P.3d 1171(Addendum A), which reversed the district
court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Where a defendant is repeatedly informed of an imminent trial, scheduled for the
next business day after she pleaded guilty, does strict compliance with rule 11(e)(3), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, require the trial court to expressly include the word "speedy"
in establishing defendant's knowledge of "the right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury"?

u

0 n certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision for correctness, giving its

conclusions of law no deference." State v. Casey, 2003 UT 33, f 10, 82 P.3d 1106.
2.

Where a defendant acknowledges on the record and through a properly

incorporated plea statement that she can appeal only the denial of her motion to suppress,
does strict compliance with rule 11 (e)(8), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require the trial
court to further clarify the defendant's limited right of appeal?
This question is reviewed under the standard applied to the first issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES OR RULES
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is appended to this petition as
Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Liza Corwell and her codefendant, Rebecca Champneys, were charged
with tampering with evidence, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated
§ 76-8-510 (1999), unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(I) (1999), and unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5
(1999) (R. 2-5).
Before trial, both defendant and Ms. Champneys moved to suppress evidence obtained
during a search of their persons and motel room (R. 49-50). Following a joint hearing, the
trial court denied the motions (R. 47-48,66; 99:24-26). Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty
to attempted tampering with evidence, a third degree felony, reserving her right to appeal the
2

trial court's denial of her motion to suppress (R. 53, 56-62, 68; 100:2, 4, 14). The court
sentenced defendant to a statutory term not to exceed five years in prison, but suspended the
sentence and placed defendant on probation (R. 72-74).
Within thirty days after the entry of judgment, defendant filed a notice of appeal and
moved to withdraw her guilty plea (R. 75, 84; 182:2-6). Upon defendant's motion to hold
the appeal in abeyance, the Utah Court of Appeals stayed the appeal and temporarily
remanded the case until the trial court ruled on defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty
plea (R. 154, 158, 160-62). The trial court denied the motion and following entry of a final
order, defendant timely filed an amended notice of appeal (R. 164, 176; 201-02; 182:5-6).
On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's denial of her suppression motion and
her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Corwell, 2003 UT App 261 at f 10.* Specifically,
defendant claimed that in taking her guilty plea the trial court failed to strictly comply with
rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by failing to inform her of the right to a "speedy"
public trial and of her "limited" right to appeal. Id. at f 11.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
withdraw her guilty plea. Id. at % 20. The court found that although defendant was informed
that "[her] case was set for trial the following Monday . . . [ , ] the mere mention of an
imminent trial is not sufficient to satisfy rule 1 l's requirement that a defendant be apprised
1

The court of appeals declined to address defendant's suppression issue,
upholding the trial court's denial of the motion based on the law of the case doctrine,
stemming from its resolution of the issue upon identical facts and issues in State v.
Champneys, No. 20020123 (Utah App. March 27, 2003 (unpublished). Cornell, 2003 UT
App 261, f l l n . l .
3

of the right to a speedy trial." Id. at ^ 15 (emphasis in original). The court also concluded
that although the trial court and defendant's plea statement "informed [defendant] that she
could appeal the denial of her motion to suppress under State v. Sery, 758 .P2d 935 (Utah
App. 1988),...[,] the trial court's only clarification of this right... was never sufficiently
explained." Id. at ^J 17. Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court had failed to
strictly comply with the requirements of rule 11 and reversed defendant's conviction. Id. at
f 20. Judge Thome concurred with the majority, but opined that "absent the specific failures
. . . I believe the colloquy was exemplary and the caution demonstrated by the trial court
should be highlighted." Id. at f 22 (Thorne, J., concurring).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
After the trial court denied defendant's suppression motion, defendant agreed to plead
guilty to a reduced charge of attempted tampering with evidence in exchange for the right to
preserve her appeal of the trial court's ruling and the dismissal of the remaining charges (R.
53,56-62,68; 100:2-4, 14).
On December 7,2001, the trial court conducted a joint change of plea hearing of both
defendant and Ms. Champneys (Plea Hearing, R. 100:1-16, Addendum C). Ms. Champneys'
counsel, in both defendant's and Ms. Champneys' presence, first informed the court that both
defendants were going to plead guilty to attempted tampering with evidence under State v.
Sery, "reserving their right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress" (R. 100:2).

2

Facts related to the motion to suppress issue are set out in the opinion, see
Cornell, 2003 UT App 261, ^j 2-6, and are omitted as irrelevant to this brief. See n.l.
4

Thereafter, in both defendants' presence, the trial court began the plea colloquy by
emphasizing that their right to appeal was being conditionally preserved through a "Sery"
plea: "[S]o everybody is clear on that, [it] means you can appeal it" (R. 100:1, 4).3
Defendant's counsel acknowledged the court's clarification: "That's correct" (R. 100:4). The
court then elicited from counsel that a change of plea statement had been prepared for
defendant, that counsel had reviewed the statement with defendant, and that counsel believed
defendant understood the statement (R. 100:4; Statement of Defendant, R. 56-62, Addendum
D). The statement stated: "I know that I have a right to a trial in open court by an impartial
jury, and that I am giving up that right by pleading guilty." The statement omitted the word
"speedy" from defendant's trial right (R. 58).
Addressing both defendant and Ms. Champneys, the court indicated that it would ask
each of them questions (R. 100:4). Thereafter, the court conducted a plea colloquy of both
defendants, alternating its questions to each defendant and receiving each defendant's answer
in turn (R. 100:4-15). The court first emphasized that it needed to be sure that defendant had
plenty of time to discuss the content of the plea statement with her attorney because she
would be surrendering rights in pleading guilty (R. 100:5). Defendant assured the court that
she had had plenty of time to review the statement with her attorney and that she believed she
understood the statement (R. 100:5). In response to the court's specific questions, defendant
acknowledged her understanding of her rights:
• pleading guilty to a third degree felony potentially subjected her to a
3

See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988).
5

maximum five-year sentence in the Utah State Prison and a fine as high
as $5,000 (R. 100:5-6);
• the court had not yet made up its mind on defendant's sentence and would
decide the sentence only after reading the presentence report and hearing
what all counsel and she had to say (R. 100:6-7);
• in giving up the right to a trial, scheduled for the following Monday, she
was giving up important constitutional and statutory rights outlined in
her statement (R. 100:7);
• by pleading guilty, there would be no trial the following Monday (R. 100:7);
• she wanted to give up her right to a trial the following Monday (R. 100:7);
• if there was a trial she would have the right, though she would not be
required, to testify and tell her story to a jury and that by not having a
trial she would not be able to testify (R. 100:7-8);
• by pleading guilty she would give up her right to confront her accusers,
witnesses that the State would call to prove her guilt of the charged
offense (R. 100:8);
• by pleading guilty she would prevent her attorney from cross examining
the State's witnesses to test their credibility (R. 100:8);
• the court presumed she was innocent and would require a
jury, if the case were tried, to presume similarly until and unless the
State proved her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 100:8-9);
• by pleading guilty she lost her right to the presumption of innocence
and that she wanted to give up that right (R. 100:9);
• by pleading guilty she gave up the opportunity to defend herself and
to require the State to meet the high standard of proving her guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 100:9-10);
• she was pleading guilty to attempted tampering with evidence, a third
degree felony, which she and Champneys had committed on March 13,
2001, by attempting to alter, destroy or conceal evidence, believing
that an official investigation was going on (R. 100:10);
6

• on March 13, 2001, at 1990 West North Temple Street, she and
Champneys, after seeing police officers and communicating with
them verbally, attempted to conceal materials (R. 100:10);
• she believed she was guilty of the offense she was pleading guilty to
(R. 100:11).
Although the court informed defendant that by pleading she was giving up her right
to the trial before an impartial jury, scheduled for the following Monday, the trial court
neglected to include the word "speedy" in its colloquy (R. 100:7-9).
The court then confirmed that defendant had not consumed alcoholic beverages in the
past twenty-four hours, was not under the influence of any drugs, and was thinking clearly
(R. 100:11). The court also elicited from defendant that nothing in the court's discussion was
unclear and that she had no questions before she tendered her guilty plea (R. 100:12). The
trial court asked defense counsel, "[A]nything else either one of you would have me ask your
client regarding Rule 11 appointments?" (R. 100:12). Counsel for Champneys said, "No"
(R. 100:12). Counsel for defendant said, "I have nothing, Your Honor" (R. 100:12).
Following Champneys' plea-taking, the court accepted defendant's guilty plea to attempted
tampering with evidence, signed defendant's statement, and observed that their appeared to
be a factual basis for the plea (R. 100:13-14). The court then expressed its belief that
defendant understood the rights she was surrendering and the attendant consequences and
that defendant had entered her plea voluntarily (R. 100:14-15). Before concluding the
proceedings, the trial court informed defendant that she had the right to be sentenced in not
less than two days but not more than forty-five days (R. 100:15).

7

The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate five-year term in the Utah
State Prison, but suspended the sentence and placed defendant on probation (R. 72-74).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 75). Defendant thereafter filed a timely motion
to withdraw her guilty plea, challenging the plea-taking on multiple grounds, including the
trial court's failure to inform her of her right to a uspeedy" trial and of the limitations on her
right to appeal (R. 84, 120-23; 182:2-6).
At the hearing on defendant's motion, defense counsel acknowledged that he had
looked at the plea statement and that defendant had said she read and understood it (R. 182:13). However, counsel asserted that defendant's motion was based on the trial court's failure
to expressly mention four rule 11 rights during the plea colloquy (R. 182:4). Although
counsel acknowledged that the colloquy could be properly supplemented by reference to
defendant's plea statement, he asserted that the statement failed to mention the right to
speedy trial (R. 182:4). The trial court observed that the plea was taken on a Friday and that
defendant had been informed that the trial was set for the following Monday, commenting,
w6

Can't get much speedier than that" (R. 182:4-5). Defense counsel agreed with the court's

comment and acknowledged that the court had informed defendant of the imminent trial
setting (R. 182:5). The court then found that defendant's rule 11 rights had been properly
explained to her through the oral colloquy in conjunction with defendant's statement (R.
182:5). The court also found that its omission during the colloquy of any rights referenced
by defendant was harmless (R. 182:5). The court denied defendant's motion, concluding that
defendant's plea was made "knowingly and voluntarily" (R. 177-78 at 178; 182:5).
8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The court of appeals incorrectly determined that because the trial court omitted the
word "speedy" in reciting the trial rights that defendant was surrendering in pleading guilty,
the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11(e). Under State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,
a trial court strictly complies with rule 11 where the circumstances of the plea-taking
effectively inform the defendant of rule 11 rights. In this case, defendant was fully aware
that her trial was scheduled for the next business day. By requiring a rote recitation of rule
11 rights in the circumstances of this case, the court of appeals has elevated form over
substance in plea-taking in contravention of this Court's governing authority.
POINT II
The court of appeals incorrectly determined that the trial court failed to adequately
inform defendant of her limited right of appeal under rule 11(e)(8). Contrary to the court of
appeals' understanding, the rule requires the trial court only to explain the extent to which
the right of appeal is preserved when a defendant conditionally pleads. In this case, it is
undisputed that defendant was aware that by conditionally pleading guilty she was
surrendering the right to appeal any aspect of her conviction other than the trial court's denial
of her motion to suppress.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS IMPROPERLY INTERPRETED
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11(e) TO REQUIRE ROTE
RECITATION OF "THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL BEFORE AN
IMPARTIAL JURY" WITHOUT REGARD TO THE SUBSTANTIVE
CONTENT OF THE COURT'S INQUIRY OR THE JUNCTURE OF
THE PROCEEDINGS AT WHICH THE COLLOQUY OCCURRED
The court of appeals held that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11(e),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by omitting the word "speedy" from the trial rights
defendant was surrendering in entering a conditional guilty plea, even though defendant
unmistakably understood her speedy trial right through notice that her trial was scheduled for
the following business day. Corwell, 2003 UT App 261, f^f 15-16, 20. By interpreting the
rule to require the rote recitation of rule 11 rights, the court of appeals has undermined this
Court's policy-based interpretation of rule 11(e) law, which focuses instead on a defendant's
comprehensive, practical understanding of the plea. See, e.g., State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,
11 11, 22 P.3d 1242; State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991).
"On certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision for correctness, giving its
conclusions of law no deference." State v. Casey, 2003 UT 33,110, 82 P.3d 1106.
This Court has placed responsibility for establishing strict compliance with all
constitutional and rule 11(e) requirements squarely on the trial court. Visser, 2000 UT 88 at
1f 11 (citing State v. Gibbons, 7'40 P.2d at 1309, 1311, 1313 (Utah 1987)). Prior to accepting
a guilty plea, the trial court must make all the inquiries necessary to determine on the record
that the defendant "has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
10

consequences" and is thus entering it voluntarily. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,243-44
(1969).
To ensure that the defendant fully understands the nature of her act, the court may
employ a variety of methods. Strict compliance "can be accomplished by multiple means.
.. as long as no requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the record reflects that the
requirement has been fulfilled." Visser, 2000 UT 88 atf 12. The methodology for ensuring
compliance with rule 11 is thus not based on the trial court's talismanic recitation of an
enumerated list of rights. There is no rote script that every trial court must follow to fulfill
the letter of the law. Id. at ^f 11 (concluding experience of trial during which the defendant
chose to enter guilty plea "communicated at least as much as would the mere oral recitation
of the 'right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury'"). Consequently, although strict
compliance is ultimately a matter of law, it will turn on the facts of each case. Maguire, 830
P.2d at 217 (citing State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Utah 1991)).
In State v. Visser, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a claim that the trial court failed
to strictly comply with rule 11(e) when it omitted the term "speedy" in informing the
defendant of his right to a speedy public trial. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ffl[13,17,22 P.3d
1242. Visser pleaded guilty mid-trial, and one day after trial moved to withdraw his guilty
plea. Id. at Tjf 3-6. In rejecting the rule 11 claim, the court recited subdivision 11(e)(8),
recognizing that "the rule is stated permissively and thus does not prevent a court from taking
into account other record factors in making its finding." Id. at Tfl2.4 The court concluded
4

Subdivision 11(e)(8) provides: "[The findings mandated by rule 11] may be
based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a sworn statement reciting
11

that because Visser was in the middle of a trial and understood from the trial court that he
had a right to continue with trial at the time he pleaded guilty, any "recitation, either orally
or by affidavit, that [he] had the 'right to a speedy trial,' would have communicated no more
than his actual trial experience to that point." Id. at ^f 14.
Purporting to distinguishing this case from Visser, the court of appeals first observed
that because defendant's plea was taken pre-trial, rather than mid-trial as in Visser,
defendant's right to a speedy trial was insufficiently communicated to her. Corwell, 2003
UT App 261 at^f 15. The court acknowledged that "the trial court did note that [defendant's]
case was set for trial the following Monday." Id. However, the court concluded that because
trials are frequently subject to delays and continuances, "the mere mention of an imminent
trial is not sufficient to satisfy rule 11 's requirement that a defendant be apprised of the right
to a speedy trial." Id. (emphasis in original).
In this case, the trial court did not simply "note" or "merely mention" that defendant's
trial was set for the following Monday. It repeatedly called defendant's attention to the
imminence of her trial during the colloquy. At the beginning of the plea-taking, in
defendant's and her counsel's presence, the trial court stated that the case was set for trial the
following Monday (R. 100:1-2). Thereafter, the court elicited from defendant that she
understood that she would be waiving important constitutional and statutory rights "if you
give up your right to have a trial which is scheduled next Monday" (R. 100:7). Immediately
afterward, the court emphasized that it wanted to make sure defendant was clear that "if you
these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and
acknowledged the contents of the sworn statement."
12

plead guilty, there's no trial next Monday. Do you understand that?" (R. 100:7). Defendant
answered affirmatively (R. 100:7). On this record, defendant could not have failed to
understand that she had a right to a speedy trial.
In distinguishing between an "imminent" trial and a "speedy" trial, the court of
appeals elevates form over substance and violates the very policy established in Visser and
Maguire which it purports to uphold: the practical circumstances of the plea-taking, rather
than a rote recitation of rights, establish whether the defendant has been sufficiently informed
of rule 11 rights before pleading. See Visser, 2000 UT 88 at ^ 11. Every criminal defendant
has a speedy trial right. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-1 -6 (1 )(f). However, this Court has repeatedly held that a criminal defendant's right to
a speedy trial is not compromised merely because the proceedings may be delayed or
continued. State v. Trqfhy, 799 P.2d 704, 706-09 (Utah 1990) (no violation of speedy trial
right under state or federal constitutions where delays not attributable to State and were
occasioned by the defendant); State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 142-43 (Utah 1989) (same);
State v. Menzies, 601 P.2d 925, 926 (Utah 1979) (no violation of statutory speedy trial right
where delays attributable to the defendant).
Moreover, contrary to the court of appeals' assertion, see Corwell, 2003 UT App 261,
Tj 15, defendant's understanding of her right to a speedy trial is supported by Visser. In
Visser, this Court held that Visser's direct experience of trial, coupled with the trial court's
explanation that Visser could pursue his trial and the absence of any allegation that the
proceedings to that point were not timely, were circumstances that sufficiently communicated

13

the right to a speedy trial.

Visser, 1245-46. The circumstances of this case equally

communicated the speedy trial right: defendant was repeatedly informed that her trial was
imminent, nothing in the record hints that the proceedings to that point had been delayed or
that trial would be continued, and defendant was repeatedly informed and agreed that by
pleading guilty she was giving up the right to a trial the following Monday (R. 100:7-9).
Whatever practical understanding or temporal limit may apply to "speedy," an "imminent"
trial set for the following business day must be included within that term. See Webster's
Third New International Dictionary (1993) ("imminent": "ready to take place; near at hand");
Webster's New World Dictionary (1956) ("imminent": "likely to happen without delay;
impending").
The court of appeals also relies on uncertain authority in asserting that the
circumstances would not have informed defendant of her right to a distinctively "speedy"
trial, as opposed to a "lengthy and delayed" trial. Corwell 2003 UT App 261 at f 16 (citing
State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134,47 P.3d 101, tmdState v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, 57 P.3d
1106). In both Hittle and Dean, the court of appeals found plain error in a colloquy and plea
statement that omitted the word "speedy" in informing the defendant of his trial rights.
Hittle, 2002 UT App 134 atffl[6-11; Dean, 2002 UT App 323,ffl[10-13. Both Hittle and
Dean are on certiorari review to this Court upon the question of whether the omission the
single word, "speedy," from the plea colloquy constitutes obvious prejudicial error. See
State's Pet. Cert, at 1 in State v. Hittle, No. 20020504-SC; State's Pet. Cert, at 1-2 in State
v. Dean, No. 20020952-SC.

14

The court of appeals' reliance on Dean is further undermined by its attempt in that
case to distinguish this Court's decision in State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 203.
Dean, 2002 UT App 323, f 11. In Martinez, the defendant claimed, among other things, that
he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter a guilty plea because the trial court did not
establish that he understood the elements of the crime, even though he repeatedly
acknowledged his understanding of those elements and the supporting facts. Id. at ff 21,2324. Although the apparent omission of the word "speedy" from the statement of trial rights
was not directly at issue, this Court held that the trial court's recitation of rule 11 rights,
including the "right to a jury trial and that the matter was set for trial," constituted strict
compliance and supported the conclusion that the guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily
entered. Id. atfflf4, 23-26.
This case is at least as compelling as Martinez. Defendant repeated assured the trial
court that she had reviewed and understood her plea statement, which stated: "I know that
I have a right to a trial in open court by an impartial jury, and that I am giving up that right
by pleading guilty" (R. 100:4-5; R. 58). The trial court repeatedly stated that defendant's trial
was set for the following Monday and that by pleading guilty defendant would be
surrendering her right to that trial (R. 100:7-9). Defendant acknowledged that nothing in the
court's discussion was unclear and that she had no questions before she tendered her guilty
plea (R. 100:12). At the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea, defense
counsel acknowledged that defendant had said she read and understood the plea statement
(R. 182:1-3). On this record, defendant cannot credibly assert that she was not aware of the
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immediacy of her trial or that her plea was not knowing or voluntary.
In sum, by focusing on form rather than substance, the court of appeals insisted that
the trial court include the term "speedy" in its rule 11 colloquy, even though the essence of
the speedy trial right was emphatically communicated by repeated notice that the trial was
imminent. Consequently, the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the trial court failed
to strictly comply with rule 11.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION, THAT THE TRIAL COURT
FAILED TO EXPLAIN DEFENDANT'S LIMITED RIGHT OF APPEAL
UNDER RULE 11, MISAPPREHENDS THE RULE AND CONFUSES
THE LEGAL ADEQUACY OF THE CONDITIONAL PLEA
The court of appeals concluded that the trial court failed to sufficiently clarify for
defendant that her "right of appeal is limited," as required by rule 11(e)(8). Corwell, 2003
UT App 261, ^f 17. However, the colloquy at the plea hearing, coupled with defendant's
correctly incorporated plea statement, make clear that defendant understood that her right of
appeal was limited.
Rule 11 (e)(8) states: "The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty . . . , and may
not accept the plea until the court has found . . . the defendant has been advised that the right
of appeal is limited." Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (e)(8).
The court of appeals' entire analysis of the trial court's purported failure to adequately
inform defendant of her rights under rule 11 (e)(l 1) is set out in a single paragraph:
The trial judge also failed to inform Corwell that her guilty plea limited
her right to appeal. "By pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have
admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives
16

all non-jurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional
violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). The trial
judge and the plea statement merely informed Corwell that she could appeal
the denial of her motion to suppress under State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah
Ct. App.1988). However, the trial court's only clarification of this right was,
"so everybody is clear on that, it means you can appeal it." "It" was never
sufficiently explained. Likewise, it was defense counsel that acknowledged
the court's "clarification." Just as a jury trial is a separate and distinct right
from the right to a speedy public trial, the limits on an appeal are separate from
the right to appeal generally. See Hittle, 2002 UT App 134 at % 8,47 P.3d 101.
Corwell, 2003 UT App 261, H 17.
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals appears to conclude that the trial court's
error lay in failing to apprise defendant that "by pleading guilty, [she] is deemed to have
admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all
non-jurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." Id. That
statement, however, unlike all other plainly stated rule 11 (e) rights, is not explicitly required
by rule 11 (e)(8). That statement is a rather technical explication of the simple fact that by
pleading guilty a criminal defendant waives the right to appeal any aspect of the conviction
and sentence. Defendant's plea statement states that if she was tried by a judge or jury she
would have the right to appeal her conviction, but that by pleading guilty she understood that
she was giving up that right (Plea Statement, R. 56-62 at 59). The plea statement, as well as
the trial court's colloquy, plainly state that defendant's plea reserved her right to appeal the
denial of the suppression motion under State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) (R. 56;
100:2-4). On direct appeal, it was undisputed that the trial court adequately incorporated the
plea statement into the colloquy by eliciting from defendant that she had had plenty of time
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to review the statement with her attorney and that she believed she understood the statement
R. (100:5).
In sum, the record of the plea-taking amply shows that defendant was fully apprised
of her limited right of appeal, to wit: by pleading guilty under Sery, she surrendered her right
to appeal any aspect of her conviction except the denial of her motion to suppress. In Visser,
this Court stated rule 11's the basic policy objective:
We thus reemphasize that the substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that
defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences
of their decision to plead guilty. That goal should not be overshadowed or
undermined by formalistic ritual.
Visser, 2000 UT 88 at f 11.5 By requiring a technical explanation of the limited right of
appeal, the court of appeals went beyond this Court's directive in Visser.
Additionally, the court of appeals factually determined that the trial court failed to
sufficiently clarify for defendant that her right of appeal was limited to her right to appeal the
denial of the motion to suppress. Specifically, the court notes that "the trial court's only
clarification of this right was, 'so everybody is clear on that, it means you can appeal it,'" but
that "it" was never sufficiently explained. Corwell, 2003 UT App 261, ^ 17. This finding
5

In fact, it is apparent from the history of rule 11 that subsection (e)(8) was
enacted to require the trial court to explain only that any appeal was limited to an
expressly reserved issue. When Gibbons issued in 1987, subdivision 11(e)(8) did not
exist. See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312; Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (1993) amendment note. In
1993, subdivisions (e)(8) and (i), the latter providing for conditional pleas, were added to
rule 11. Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (1993) amendment note. Thus, it appears clear that
subdivision 1 l(e)(8)'s "limited right of appeal" contemplates only the circumstance in
which a defendant pleads conditionally guilty and that the requirement to advise
defendant of his limited right of appeal goes only to assuring that defendant knows that by
pleading the right to appeal a specific issue is reserved.
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is inexplicable considering the court of appeals' recognition that "[t]he trial judge and the
plea statement merely informed Corwell that she could appeal the denial of her motion to
suppress understate v. Sery" Moreover, the record fully supports that defendant must have
understood that "if referred to her right to appeal the denial of her suppression motion.
Defense counsel for Champneys indicated that both Champneys and defendant were going
to plead guilty "under State v. Sery, reserving their right to appeal the denial of the motion
to suppress" (R. 100:2). Barely more than a page of transcript later, defendant's counsel said,
"And again Your Honor, the State agreed (inaudible) State v. Sery" (R. 100:4). The trial
court immediately responded, "Which, so that everybody is clear on that, means you can
appeal it" (R. 100:4). Given the proximity of the earlier express announcement that
defendant was reserving her right to appeal the denial of her suppression motion to the trial
court's acknowledgment that defendant could appeal "it," defendant's acknowledgment that
she was "thinking clearly," and her obvious engagement in the entire plea-taking from start
to finish, the court of appeals' finding that the trial court failed to sufficiently clarify that
defendant knew she was reserving her right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion
is untenable. Indeed, defendant's appeal of the denial of her motion to suppress evinces her
understanding of the limited right of appeal as articulated by the trial court.
Significantly, the court of appeals' factual finding goes beyond any alleged factual
error ever asserted by defendant. Defendant, in the trial court and on direct appeal, claimed
that the trial court had failed to explain under rule 11 (e)(8) that by pleading guilty defendant
was surrendering the right to attack nonjurisdictional defects (R. 120-23, 182:2-6; Aplt. Br.
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at 24-25). However, defendant never claimed that the trial court had failed to sufficiently
inform her that her plea reserved her right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion.
Both in her opening and reply briefs, defendant conceded that the trial court informed her
that her plea expressly reserved her right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion.
Aplt. Br. at 25; Reply at 8. Thus, the court of appeals has engaged in fact-finding to save a
concession already made by defendant. Utah's appellate courts have consistently declined
to reverse on a point of law or fact conceded by a party. See State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406,
407 (Utah 1984); State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 710-11 (Utah App. 1993).
In sum, the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the trial court had failed to
inform defendant of her limited right of appeal under rule 11(e)(8).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated, the State asks this Court to reverse the court of appeals'
determination that the trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11(e).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j±_ day of February, 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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Corwell appeals from the trial court's denial of her
withdraw her guilty plea from a conviction for
tampering with evidence in violation of Utah Code
§§ 76-8-510 and 76-4-101 (1999). We reverse and

BACKGROUND
%2 On March 13, 2001, Detectives Troy Anderson and Tracy Ita of
the Salt Lake City Police Department investigated a report that
Corwell and Rebecca Champneys might be "using and/or selling
narcotics" at a motel. The informant specifically directed the
detectives to room number 236 at the Motel 6, located at 1990
West North Temple Street in Salt Lake City.
H3
Based on this information, the detectives went to the motel
room and knocked on the door. Detective Ita identified himself
as "Tracy" and, after Champneys expressed some confusion, Ita
responded that he was "Tracy with the Salt Lake City Police

Department." Then both officers displayed their badges--Ita
through the peep hole in the door and Anderson through an
adjoining window. Anderson testified that there was a "six to
twelve" inch gap between the curtain and the door through which
he could see into the room. When the detectives asked if Corwell
was also in the room, Champneys initially responded negatively.
She later admitted that Corwell was in the room, however, after
Anderson observed another woman in the room.
1f4 After the detectives displayed their badges and asked
Champneys to open the door, Champneys attempted to close the gap
in the curtains. At the same time, Anderson saw Corwell put what
he thought was a crack pipe into a purse and put it behind the
bed. Anderson then observed "a lot of movement in the room,"
including trips to the bathroom by both women and efforts to
conceal objects under the bed.
15
The detectives repeatedly asked Champneys to open the door.
When she refused, Ita obtained a key from the motel manager.
Even with the key, however, the detectives were unable to enter
the room because the women had dead-bolted the door. Detective
Ita then kicked the door open.
f6
Once inside the room, Anderson arrested Champneys and
Corwell. A search of Champneys turned up a metallic pipe, which
she admitted she used to smoke cocaine. He also discovered
cocaine, Kleenex, and a burnt Brillo pad. A search of Corwell
revealed a rock of cocaine and drug paraphernalia. While being
searched in the bathroom, Champneys grabbed some cocaine from the
counter and tried to flush it down the drain.
f7
On September 19, 2001, the trial court denied Corwell's
motion to suppress. On December 7, 2001, Corwell entered a
conditional guilty plea to attempted tampering with evidence,
reserving her right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the
suppression motion. Though both the plea statement and the trial
court's questioning omitted the word "speedy" from the discussion
of Corwellfs rights, the trial court did inform Corwell that by
pleading guilty she was giving up her right to a trial before an
impartial jury, and that her trial was scheduled for the
following Monday.
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On April 2, 2002, judgment was entered. On April 26, 2002,
Corwell filed a notice of appeal. However, on April 29, Corwell
moved to withdraw her guilty plea. On June 5, 2002, Corwell
filed a motion and memorandum "to hold appeal in abeyance and to
stay the briefing schedule pending disposition of motion to
withdraw guilty plea." In her motion, Corwell stated that if the
trial court denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, she
planned to appeal the denial of the motion to this court and
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would then request that this court consolidate her appeals from
her conviction and the denial of her motion.
f9
On June 20, this court stayed the appeal and temporarily
remanded the case, directing the trial court to rule on Corwell•s
motion to withdraw her guilty plea. In granting the stay, this
court stated: "If the trial court denies the motion, Appellant
shall file an amended notice of appeal under the same appellate
case number." On June 21, the trial court denied the motion. On
September 10, Corwell filed a supplemental designation of record,
a supplemental certificate, and a supplemental request for
transcript. The final order was not entered until October 11,
2002. On October 28, 2002, Corwell filed an amended notice of
appeal of the trial court's denial of her motion to withdraw the
guilty plea.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
flO Corwell challenges the trial court's denial of her motion to
withdraw her guilty plea. Specifically, Corwell challenges the
trial court's compliance with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure in taking her guilty plea. Whether the trial
court strictly complied with rule 11 is a question of law, which
we review for correctness. See State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT
60,110, 983 P.2d 556 ("the . . . question of whether the trial
court strictly complied with constitutional and procedural
requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that
is reviewed for correctness" (quoting State v. Holland, 921 P.2d
430, 433 (Utah 1996))) .
ANALYSIS
f11 Corwell challenges the trial court's denial of her motion to
withdraw her guilty plea, arguing
that the trial court failed to
strictly comply with rule 11fs requirements that she be informed
of her right to a speedy trial
and that her guilty plea would
limit her right to appeal.1

1. Corwell also argues that the police did not have probable
cause to search her hotel room. This exact issue was previously
addressed by this court in an appeal filed by Corwell's codefendant. See State v. Champneys, Case No. 20020123 (Utah Ct.
App. March 27, 2003) . Under the terms of State v. Ellis, 969
P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the law of the case doctrine
renders Champnevs binding on us for the purposes of Corwell's
appeal. Accordingly, we decline to address the issue.
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f12 It is well established that rule 11*s requirements must be
strictly complied with by trial courts. Rule 11(e) "squarely
places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional
and rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea
is entered." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1937).
This duty requires "strict compliance" with the rule, State v.
Abevta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993), which means "'"that the
trial court [must] . . . establish on the record that the
defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights [to
a] speedy public trial before an impartial jury."'" State v.
Dean, 2002 UT App 323,110 n.2, 57 P.3d 1106 (quoting State v.
Visser, 2000 UT 88,ff10-11, 22 P.3d 1242 (quoting Utah R. Crim.
P. 11(e))).
113 In Visser, however, the Utah Supreme Court held that the
strict compliance rule does not "mandate a particular script or
rote recitation of the rights listed." Visser, 2000 UT 88 at
111. Instead, the rule requires that the trial court ensure that
defendants know their rights and the consequences for waiving
them by pleading guilty. See id. While the trial court must
therefore make certain that "no requirement of the rule is
omitted," id. at 1l2, the court is allowed to rely on the
circumstances of the case to determine whether the defendant has
been appraised of his or her rights. See id.
114 The facts of Visser are instructive. In Visser, the
defendant entered a guilty plea in the middle of his trial. See
id. at fl. He later filed a motion to withdraw his plea, arguing
that the trial court had failed to inform him of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury.
See id. The trial court denied the motion. See id. at 16. On
review, the supreme court concluded that "'strict compliance can
be accomplished by multiple means.'" Id. at 1l2 (quoting State
v. Maauire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991)). Thus, where "'the
contents of other documents such as the information, presentence
reports, exhibits, etc.,1" indicate that "'no requirement of the
rule [has been) omitted,1" the court's ruling will be deemed to
have been in compliance with rule 11. Visser, 2000 UT 88 at 1l2
(citations omitted). Accordingly, insofar as "the record
detail[ed] Visser's personal trial experience up to the point of
his plea agreement," the supreme court therefore "conclude[d]
that this experience communicated at least as much as would the
mere oral recitation of the 'right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury.'" Id. at fl3.
115 The present case presents a scenario significantly different
from that presented in Visser. Whereas Visser's mid-trial status
evidenced a clear understanding of his right to a speedy trial,
Corwell's trial had not yet started at the time of her plea.
Thus, she was never afforded the right to a speedy trial, and no
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such right was communicated to her in the colloquy. It is true
that the trial court did note that Corwell's case was set for
trial the following Monday. We conclude, however, that this
mention did not effectively communicate to Corwell that she had a
right to a speedy trial. Modern trial practice is replete with
opportunities for delay, postponement, or continuance. Without
more, the mere mention of an imminent trial date is not
sufficient to satisfy rule 11fs requirement that a defendant be
apprised of the right to a speedy trial.
fl6 This conclusion is supported by our prior case law. In
State v. Hittle, we concluded that omitting the word "speedy"
constituted plain error because "the constitutional right to a
speedy trial is a distinct right of criminal defendants, separate
from the right to a trial before an impartial jury." 2002 UT App
134,18, 47 P.3d 101. "If the defendant is not fully informed of"
his [or her] rights prior to pleading guilty, then the guilty
plea cannot be voluntary." Id. at flO. Although the term
"speedy" "may be communicated by various means to the defendant,
[it] may not be considered [a] merely inconsequential modifier[]
to the jury trial right." Dean, 2002 UT App 323 at flO n.2.
Here, nothing in the record suggests that the trial court
established that Corwell waived anything more than her right to a
lengthy and delayed trial.
fl7 The trial judge also failed to inform Corwell that her
guilty plea limited her right to appeal. "By pleading guilty,
the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential
elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional
violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989).
The trial judge and the plea statement merely informed Corwell
that she could appeal the denial of her motion to suppress under
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). However, the
trial court's only clarification of this right was, "so everybody
is clear on that, it means you can appeal it." "It" was never
sufficiently explained. Likewise, it was defense counsel that
acknowledged the court's "clarification." Just as a jury trial
is a separate and distinct right from the right to a speedy
public trial, the limits on an appeal are separate from the right
to appeal generally. See Hittle, 2002 UT App 123 at f8.
fl8 The State contends that by failing to include the right to a
speedy trial and the provision concerning the limited right to
appeal in the plea statement, and by failing to point out the
omissions when the trial judge asked "if there was anything
either one of you would have me ask your client regarding Rule 11
appointments," Corwell invited error. We disagree. "[I]t is not
sufficient to assume that defense attorneys make sure that their
clients fully understand the contents of the affidavit."
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Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313. The duty to ensure that defendants
know and understand the rights they are surrendering when
pleading guilty rests not on the parties, but on the trial court.
See id. at 1312.
fl9 The State also claims that the trial court strictly complied
with the rule 11 requirements insofar as Corwell was aware of the
rights that were overlooked, and that the guilty plea was
properly accepted. In his order denying Corwell's motion to
withdraw her guilty plea, the trial judge conceded that he
covered "most" of the rule 11 requirements and thus
"substantially" complied with rule 11(e). However, case law
requires "strict compliance with rule 11, rather than substantial
compliance" when accepting a guilty plea. See id. at 1313-14;
see also Visser, 2000 UT 88 at fll; Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995;
State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186,Hl2, 5 P.3d 1222. The
quantum of error is irrelevant; rather, strict compliance
requires reversal in this case because the trial court failed to
inform Corwell of two of her constitutionally protected rights.
See Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186 at fl9. Accordingly, the trial
court did not strictly comply with rule 11(e), and it erred in
denying Corwell's timely motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
CONCLUSION
U20 The trial court erred in denying Corwell's motion to
withdraw her guilty plea because the trial court did not strictly
comply with rule 11(e) during the plea colloquy. Accordingly, we
reverse the denial of Corwell's motion to withdraw her plea,
vacate her conviction, and remand for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

Norman H. Jackson,
Presiding Judge

121

I CONCUR:

t&****L-i?

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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THORNE, Judge, (concurring):
f22 I concur with the decision to reverse the trial court's
denial of Corwell's motion to withdraw her plea based on the
trial court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, absent the specific
failures outlined in the majority opinion, I believe the plea
colloquy was exemplary and the caution demonstrated by the trial
court should be highlighted. During the colloquy, the trial
court conducted an in-depth discussion with Corwell addressing
virtually all of the rights due her in the criminal proceeding.
The discussion ranged from the court's ensuring that Corwell had
read and understood the pleading document prepared by counsel,
to its explaining that, in pleading guilty, she was waiving her
right to a jury trial, her right to confront the State's
witnesses, the presumption of innocence, and the State's duty to
prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also
explained to Corwell the range of possible sentences she faced
should she accept the plea agreement.
123 Furthermore, it is clear from the record that the trial
court understood that rule 11 does not envision nor require the
recitation of a formulaic speech. Rather, the trial court
understood that, under rule 11, its role was to conduct an actual
inquiry into the nature and depth of the defendant's
understanding of her rights and to ensure that her plea was
entered in a knowing and voluntary fashion.
f24 Finally, because the court accepted the plea pursuant to
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and
because the trial was scheduled to begin on the day following the
plea hearing, the court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11
is understandable, albeit insufficient to satisfy our rule 11
jurisprudence.
f25 Accordingly, I concur with the decision to reverse and
remand the trial court's denial of Corwell's motion to withdraw
her guilty plea.
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ADDENDUM B

Rule 11. Pleas.
'a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty.

(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits forfilingany motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a sworn statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the sworn statement. If the defendant cannot understand the
English language, it will be sufficient that the sworn statement has been read
or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits forfilingany motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by
the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.
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1

SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH; DECEMBER 7, 2001

2

HONORABLE JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. FINLAYSON:

6

co-defendant.

1

that's resolved.

8

Champneys.

9
10

Mr. Fmlayson?

We can handle that.

THE COURT:

It's No. 9, Rebecca

Ms. Corwell?

12

MR. ANDERSON:

Right.
Yes.

Ms. Corwell is standing beside

me.

14

THE COURT:

And I assume Ms. Champneys is here.

He

she is.

16

MR. FINLAYSON:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. FINLAYSON:

19

case

Oh, yes and I believe Mr. Anderson has

MR. FINLAYSON:

15

We have a

Mr. Anderson and I have a co-defendant

11

13

Good morning Your Honor.

She is, Your Honor.

Okay.
Your Honor, there is two files for

Champneys.

20

MR. ANDERSON:

21

THE COURT:

If I may approach Your Honor?

Uh-huh (affirmative). Oh, yes, I was

22

about to ask for that.

All right.

The matters before me are

23

State of Utah vs. Rebecca Champneys Case #011905093 and State

24

of Utah vs. Lisa Corwell, #011905094.

25

consolidated and set for trial on Monday next and it looks li

These matters were

1

both the defendants are present and so where are we today?

2

MR. FINLAYSON:

Your Honor, let me ask you, sometimes

3

the wheels move faster than you think they are going to but I

4

got a call from West Valley that they were going to send a case

5

over on Rebecca from West Valley and I think Evelyn called.

6

COURT CLERK: Murray.

7

MR. FINLAYSON:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. FINLAYSON:

Was it Murray?

I got something from Murray.
I guess because they found out we

10

were going to resolve these, they sent it over and we have a

11

resolution on that case is you'd like to do it today as well?

12

THE COURT:

They just thought I needed a little more

13

work?

14

I'll take the case as long as there's a resolution.

15

Now, if I sent one to Murray there would be hell to pay.

MR. FINLAYSON:

My understanding, Your Honor, is that

16

both Ms. Champneys and Ms. Corwell are going to plead guilty to

17

a third degree attempt at tampering with evidence and we have,

18

it would be a plea under State vs. Sery, reserving their right

19

to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.

20
21
22

MR. LEMCKE:

That is the State's understanding, Your

Honor.
MR. FINLAYSON:

And then for Ms. Champneys she's also

23

going to plead guilty to a an attempt on Count 1 of the case

24

ending in #0772 to a Class A.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let me see if I have this right.
2

1

Ms. Champneys is pleading guilty to attempted forgery m

2

#8743, right?

3
4

MR. FINLAYSON:
don't they?

5

They give it a different case number

It's #8743?

THE COURT:

#8743 is the one 1 have that the charge

6

is forgery.

7

tampering with evidence.

8

MR. FINLAYSON:

9

MR. ANDERSON:

That's the one from Murray I guess.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. ANDERSON:

12

Case

Then I have

Right.
It would be an attempted tampering.

Pardon me?
Attempted tampering with evidence

would make it a third degree felony.

13

THE COURT:

Well, let's take the ones I've got then.

14

Ms. Champneys is going to plead to attempted tampering with

15

evidence, a third degree felony and apparently Ms. Corweil

16

going to do the same in her case?

17

MR. ANDERSON:

18

THE COURT:

19

is

That's correct, Your Honor.

And then Count 2 and 3, what happens to

those as far as Ms. Champneys is concerned in Case #5093?

20

MR. FINLAYSON:

21

THE COURT:

22

here.

23

Misdemeanor?

Dismissed, Your Honor.

Then the Murray case that I've inherited

She's going to plead to attempted forgery, a Class A

24

MR. FINLAYSON:

25

THE COURT:

That's right, Your Honor.

Court 2 dismissed?

3

1

MR. FINLAYSON:

2

THE COURT:

3

Mr. Corwell is going to plead to

attempted tampering, a third, Mr. Anderson, is that right?

4

MR. ANDERSON:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. ANDERSON:

7

Yes, Your Honor.

And Counts 2 and 3 dismissed?
That's correct.

And again Your Honor

the State agreed (inaudible) State vs. Sery.

8
9

Right.

THE COURT:

Which, so everybody is clear on that,

means you can appeal it.

10

MR. ANDERSON:

11

THE COURT:

That's correct.

I don't have any objection to that.

I

12

always encourage appellate review on any decisions I may make.

13

Okay.

Statements have been prepared for both these ladies?

14

MR. ANDERSON:

15

MR. FINLAYSON:

16

THE COURT:

17

Yes, Your Honor.
Yes.

And have you both reviewed them with yojr

respective clients?

18

MR. FINLAYSON:

19

MR. ANDERSON:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. ANDERSON:

22

THE COURT:

I have, Your Honor.
Yes, Your Honor.

Do you believe they understand them?
Yes.

Ms. Champneys, let me ask you a couple of

23

questions and then I'm going to ask you and Ms. Corwell some

24

questions together but as far as you're concerned, Ms.

25

Champneys, you have read through the document that Mr.
4

1

Finlayson has there for your signature ultimately here toda>°

2

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

3

THE COURT:

4

Yes, I have.

And did you have plenty of time to

discuss the matters contained in that document with h m ?

5

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

6

THE COURT:

I did.

The reason I ask that is, I don't anybody

7

to be rushed because the decisions we're making here today are

8

important decisions as far as you're concerned and I don't want

9

you giving up any rights that you may have without the full

10

opportunity to consider those.

11

that?

12

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

13

THE COURT:

Do you believe you've done

I believe I have, yes.

Ms. Corwell, same question.

Have you

14

reviewed the statement that Mr. Anderson has there for you9

15

Have you had plenty of time to do that?

16

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

17

THE COURT:

18

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

19

THE COURT:

Yes.

Do you believe you understand it?
Yes.

Do you also understand the importance of

20

the rights that you give up by pleading guilty that are

21

contained in that document?

22

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

23

THE COURT:

(inaudible).

You both understand that when a person

24

pleads guilty to a Third Degree Felony that the potential

25

maximum sentence is a term in the Utah State Prison that can oe

5

1
2

as long as five years and a fine that can be as high as $5,033.
You both understand that?

3

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

(inaudible).

4

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. ANDERSON:

7

THE COURT:

(inaudible).

Answer out loud please.
Answer out loud.

Ms. Champneys as far as you're concerned,

8

there's a Class A Misdemeanor in this Murray case,

9

forgery, a Class A Misdemeanor carries a potential of a year in

attempted

10

the county jail and a fine as high as $2,500.

11

understand that's a possibility on the Class A Misdemeanor?

12

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

13

THE COURT:

14

Do you

I do.

Does the statement cover both of these

cases on the same document?

15

MR. FINLAYSON:

16

THE COURT:

It does, Your Honor.

Okay.

And Mr. Champneys, you understand

17

that if I thought it was necessary to incarcerate you on both

18

these cases, at the State Prison, I could make the sentences

19

run consecutively.

In other words, when you finished one, the

20

other would start.

Do you understand that's always a

21

possibility?

22

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

23

THE COURT:

(Nods head in the affirmative)

Now, what's going to happen in sentencing

24

I don't know.

I haven't made up my mind on this.

I haven't

25

even given it any thought at all, I don't know (inaudible) and
6

1

I won't make up my mind until I'm here on the sentencing day

2

and I've read the pre-sentence reports and I have the benefit

3

of what the two of you say and what your attorneys have to say

4

and what the State's attorney has to say.

5

making that decision.

That's when I'll be

Both of you understand that?

6

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

7

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

8

THE COURT:

(Nods head in the affirmative).
(Nods head in the affirmative).

Now, if you give up your right to have a

9

trial which is scheduled next Monday, do you both understand

10

that you give up an important and significant constitutional

11

and statutory rights as outlined in the paper you both read?

12

Do you both understand that?

13

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

14

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

15

THE COURT:

(Nods head in the affirmative).
(Nods head in the affirmative).

I want you also to understand that some

16

of those rights I want to talK with you about today, just to

17

make sure that I'm satisfied you're clear.

18

guilty, there's no trial next Monday.

19

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

20

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

21

THE COURT:

22

If you plead

Do you understand that?

(Nods head in the affirmative).
(Nods head in the affirmative).

Do you want to give up

your right to

have a trial next Monday?

23

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

24

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

25

THE COURT:

If there's no trial then you don't get to
7

1

testify because there won't be anybody to testify to.

if *e

2

did try this case, both of you, if you chose, wouldn't have to,

3

but if you chose, could testify and tell the jury what occjrred

4

or did not occur in connection with these cases.

5

understand you're giving up that right?

Do you botr

6

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

7

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

8

THE COURT:

9

Also, I want you to understand that if

you plead guilty, you are giving up you right to confront your

10

accusers and what that means is the people that would be called

11

by the State in an attempt to convince a ]ury that you

12

committed this crime you're charged with.

13

have the right to cross examine them and test their credibility

14

and point out any inconsistencies in their testimony and you

15

won't get to see them here in the courtroom.

16

understand you're giving up that right?

Your attorney won't

Do you both

17

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

18

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

19

THE COURT:

Both of you at this point in time, are

20

presumed innocent.

As far as I'm concerned, you did not commit

21

these crimes and that won't change until you tell different if

22

you do here today.

23

the jury to think the same way.

24

sit on the ]ury unless they agreed that they would start the

25

case on Monday with the two of you presuming that you were both

But if we tried this case, I would require
In other words, they could rot

8

1

innocent and I would tell them that that presumption would have

2

to follow this case unless and until, if the State could, prove

3

you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

4

presumption of innocense stays with you.

5

on any evidence, the verdict is not guilty because the

6

presumption of innocense assumes and presumes that you are not

7

guilty.

8

you both understand that?

9

But otherwise, the
The State doesn't pat

That all goes away if you say guilty here today. Do

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

10

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

11

THE COURT:

12

Do you both want to give up your right to

the presumption of innocense?

Both want to give that right up?

13

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

14

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

15

THE COURT:

Okay.

You recall that I mentioned the

16

State has to prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

17

That's a very high standard of proof and the burden of proof is

18

always on the State.

19

prove that you did not commit this crime. You can put on

20

evidence if you wanted to but you're not required to.

21

burden of proof always stays with the State and if the State

22

could not convince every member of the jury that you committed

23

these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, a high standard of

24

proof, then the jury finds you not guilty.

25

understand you're giving up that opportunity?

Neither one of you has any obligation to

The

Do you both

9

1

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

2

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

3

THE COURT:

Now, you both pleaded guilty on your

4

respective cases to attempted tampering with evidence.

The

5

State claims that these third degree felonies were committed at

6

1990 West North Temple here in Salt Lake County on March 13cn

7

of this year and there the State claims that each one of you,

8

believing that there was an official proceeding or an

9

investigation going on, that you either altered, destroyed, or

10

attempted to alter, destroy, or conceal evidence in connection

11

with that investigation.

Is that true?

12

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

13

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. ANDERSON:

(Nods head in the affirmative).
Yes, Your Honor.

What's the factual statement here?
Your Honor, on March 13 at 1990 West

16

North Temple, after seeing police officers and having verbal

17

communications with a police officer at a hotel room

18

(inaudible) did attempt to conceal materials (inaudible) .

19
20

THE COURT:

Is that correct as far as a factual

statement is concerned, Ms. Corwell:

21

MS. CORWELL:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. ANDERSON:

24
25

Yes.
Same thing for Ms. Champneys?
Yes, Your Honor, Ms. Champneys was

with Ms. Corwell.
THE COURT:

Are those the facts here, Ms. Champneys?
10

1

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

2

THE COURT:

(Nods head in the affirmative).

So, I'm entering your guilty pleas here

3

today. Ladies, you believe you're guilty of what you're

4

pleading guilty to?

5

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

6

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

7

THE COURT:

8

Have either one of you consumed an

alcoholic beverages in the last 24 hours?

9

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Shakes head in the negative).

10

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Shakes head in the negative).

11

THE COURT:

12

Have either one of you taken any drugs of

any kind, prescription or otherwise?

13

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

14

THE COURT:

15

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

16

THE COURT:

17

What kind of prescription, Ms. Champneys?
I take (inaudible).

And does that effect your ability to

think clearly?

18

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

19

THE COURT:

20

I have, prescription.

No.

So do you believe you're thinking clearly

right now?

21

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

22

THE COURT:

23

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

24

THE COURT:

25

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

Yes.

Ms. Corwell, any drugs of any kind?
(Shakes head in the negative).

Do you believe you're thinking clearly?
Yes.

11

1

THE COURT:

Is there anything I've said about the

2

rights that you're giving up or what we discussed about t m s

3

plea arrangement that is unclear to either one of you?

4

Anything unclear?

5

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

6

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

7

THE COURT: Any questions you want to ask me before

8

you offer a guilty plea?

9

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

10

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

11

THE COURT: Counsel, anything else either one of you

12

would have me ask your client regarding Rule 11 appointments?

13

MR. ANDERSON:

14

MR. FINLAYSON:

15

I have nothing, Your Honor.
No Your Honor, we do have the Class

on Ms. Champneys too.

16

THE COURT:

Oh yeah.

17

MR. ANDERSON:

I can provide a factual basis for

On July 18ch at 2120 South State, Ms. Champneys

18

that.

19

attempted to utter writing a check, pass a check purporting to

20

be acting with another to do fraud and that she had reason to

21

believe the check was a bad check.

22

THE COURT:

23

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

24

THE COURT:

25

Is that correct, Ms. Champneys?
Yes.

That's what happened on July 18th, you

tried to pass a bad check?

1

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes.

2

THE COURT:

3

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

4

THE COURT:

5

Class A Misdemeanor?

You knew it was not a good check?

So do you believe you're guilty of that

6

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

7

THE COURT:

8
9
10
11
12
13

Yes,

Yes, I do.

Mr. Lemcke, anything else on the Rule A

requirements?
MR. LEMCKE:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
You may sign the statement, ladies, if

you choose to at this point in time.
MR. FINLAYSON:

The (inaudible) have been signed,

Your Honor.

14

MR. ANDERSON:

May we approach, Your Honor?

15

THE COURT:

Please.

16

All right.

Ms. Champneys, for the record then to the

17

attempted tampering of evidence, a third degree felony charge,

18

claimed to have occurred at 1990 West North Temple here in Salt

19

Lake County on March 13th, 2001, is charged in the case ending

20

5093, how do you plead?

21

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

22

THE COURT:

Guilty.

Turning to the second case 0011918743,

23

the one that came in from Murray, you are charged with

24

attempted forgery, a Class A Misdemeanor, claimed to have

25

occurred at 2120 South State Street here in Salt Lake County on

13

1

July 18:n of 2001, how do you plead?

2

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

3

THE COURT:

Guilty.

The record will show that I reviewed the

4

statement and along with the discussions I've had with Ms.

5

Champneys, I believe that her pleas are properly given and

6

knowingly given.

7

gives up and also the potential consequences and therefore I've

8

signed the statement and I accept the two pleas.

9
10

I think she understands her rights that she

I assume the State's motions then to dismiss Count 2
and 3 in 5093?

11

MR. LEMCKE:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. LEMCKE:

14

THE COURT:

The State does, Your Honor.
And Count 2 in 8743?
The State does, Your Honor.
Now, Ms. Corwell, you're charged now with

15

attempted tampering with evidence, a third degree felony,

16

claimed to have occurred at 1990 West North Temple here in Salt

17

Lake County on March 13th of 2001.

18

plead?

19

MS. CORWELL:

20

THE COURT:

21

On that charge, how do you

Guilty.
Guilty?

The State's motion to dismiss

Counts 2 and 3?

22

MR. LEMCKE:

23

THE COURT:

It is, Your Honor.
So ordered.

I've signed the statement

24

that Ms. Corwell has executed .

I believe there's a factual

25

basis for the guilty plea and I also believe that she
14

1

understands the rights that she gives up and the potential

2

consequences and has voluntarily entered her plea.

3

Okay.

Ms. Champneys and Ms. Corwell, having pled

4

guilty to a third degree felony and a Class A Misdemeanc

5

third degree felony, I advise you that you have the right :o be

6

sentenced not earlier than two nor more than 45 days from

7

today's date.

8
9

and a

I assume you want pre-sentence reports on both these
ladies?

10

MR. ANDERSON:

11

MR. FINLAYSON:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. ANDERSON:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. FINLAYSON:

16

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
Yes.

February 1st?
That's fine, Your Honor.

Mr. Finlayson?
That's fine, Judge.

I'll set the, I'll refer these matter to

17

the Adult Probation and Parole for preparation of a pre-

18

sentence report.

19

Sentencing set for September 1st at 9:00.

Ms. Champneys and Ms. Corwell, I'm going to give you

20

a referral to Adult Probation and Parole.

The first order of

21

business is to be in contact with them.

22

of the holiday period coming up, the time frame for getting

23

pre-sentence reports done is lessened.

24

office less than they usually are.

25

them.

Do not delay.

Because

People are in the

Do not fail to contact

Do not fail to follow through on the pre-sentence
15

If that occurs and you get here on February Is" and I

1

report.

2

don't have a pre-sentence report because you haven't made any

3

effort to do it then I sentence you without it and you don't

4

want me to do that. You've seen what happens today.

5

this a priority to get the pre-sentence report done.

6

be to your advantage.

7

to the Court's finding as you've both signed off on the form on

8

the findings of facts and conclusion?

9

It will

While I recognize there's an objection

MR. ANDERSON:

10

MR. FINLAYSON:

11

THE COURT:

12

So, make

Yes, Your Honor.
Yes, Judge.

I will sign those now including the order

in both cases and I will see you all on the 1st of February.

13

MR. FINLAYSON:

Thank you, Your Honor.

14

MR. ANDERSON:

15

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

Thank you, Your Honor.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(C)

15

CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in
the before mentioned hearing held before Judge Timothy R.
Hanson was transcribed by me from a videotape
and is a full, true and correct transcription of the
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages
to the best of my ability.
Signed this 19th day of May, 2002 in Sandy,
Utah.

<^\A*J\>&$*^>

t— /
Carolyn Jlrickson
Certified Shorthand Reporter
Certified Court Transcriber
My Commission expires May 4, 2002

NOTARY PUBL C

CAROLYN E-RICKSON
'775 ELLEN WAY
SANOY UT &4092
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
MAY 4 2006
STATE OF UTAH

ADDENDUM D

F'tEOOISTRTT «n;nv
Thi-r

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
D T T ; Mi
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STA
By

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT,
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
AND ORDER

CASE NO.

vs.
-Zii.

<7itfCjrC<!f

U'AvrYafs^dl

Defendant.
CCMES NOW.

L,2* (Jfc/irCl

the defendant in

case and hereby acJcnowledges and c e r t i f i e s the foHewing:
I am entering a plea of guilty to the following crime (s;
CRIME i SUITOR?
gRQVISISN

DJ£R££

PUNIS3gNT
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandat:

A.

8.

c.
D.

3/1/5:

-2I have received a copy of the Information against a*, : have
read it, and I understand the nature and elements cf the offense s
for which I am pleading guilty.
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as
f Q 11 nw« : Via f *n*

„r

* £ > < > A/jr, A fS. *V>(

* £ Iff6

//>,>J / '• ,r

\

«y'conduct, 'and the ccpfduct of othe-c persons for whirr. I ar.
criminally l i a b l e /

that constitutes the elements of the crime(s;

charged i s as follows:.

/ryLr

<mr>n~

f^-*'

<*(<>*J*

^J

Jfr

AA<(

f<x<r*\ sfa.-

t2± /^^(yr^I am entering this/these pleats) voluntarily and with
knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
1.
I know that I have the right to be represented fey an
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will ce
appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize chat a
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as
determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if s:
appointed for me.

S~l
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I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel.

I: : have

waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly, inteiiiger.-ly
and voluntarily for the following reasons:

3.

If r have waived my right to counsel, I have real this

statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges, r.y
rights in this case and other proceedings and the consequences c:
my plea of guilty.
fl,

4.

If I h*ve-not waived my right to counsel, my attorney 15

ftyf^Srfc L
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, and I have had an opportunity to fully

discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my guil-y
plea with ay attorney.
5.

I know that I have a right to a trial in open court by an

impartial jury, and that I am giving up that right by pleading
guilty.
6.

I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right t:

confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have the.-,
cross-examined by my attorney.

I also know that I have the righ-

to compel my witness(s) by subpoena at State expense to testify
court in my behalf.

m

I understand that I am giving up these rights

if I plead guilty.
7.

1 know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf

but if I choose not to do so I cannot be compelled to testify c:
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be
drawn against me if I do not testify.

I understand that I ar.

giving up these rights if I plead guilty.
8.

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I

need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for trial.
At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each
element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
before a jury the verdict must be unanimous.

If the trial is
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I understand the fact that as a defendant I enjoy the

of a presumption

presumed

innocent

of innocence.

until

the

State

I understand

proves

my

guilt

that

: am

beyond

a

reasonable doubt if this case is tried to a jury, or until I plead
guilty.

I understand that I give up the right to the presume tier.

of innocence if I plead guilty.
10.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were

tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I would have tne
right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of
Appeals .or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court, and that if :
could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs
would be paid by the State.

I understand that I am giving u? these

rights if I plead guilty.
11.

I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each

offense to which I plead guilty.

I know that by pleading guilty to

an offense that carries a minimum mandatory senter.ee

that I will be

subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory senzer.ee
offense.

for that

I know that the sentence may be consecutive and may be

for a prison term, fine or both.

I know that in addition to a

fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed.

I

also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make restitution to
any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be
owed on charges that are dismissed, if any, as a result of this
plea agreement.
12.

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods,

or the fine for an additional amount, if my plea is to more than
one charge.
awaiting

I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or

sentencing

on

another

offense

of which

I have beer,

convicted or to which I have pled guilty, my plea in the present
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
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I know and understand

that by pleading guilty,

: am

waiving and giving up my statutory and constitutional rights se:
out in the preceding paragraphs,

r also know chat by entering such

plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the
conduct alleged and I am guilty off the crime (s) for which my
piea(s) is/are entered.
14.

My plea(s) off guilty (is)(is not) the result of a plea

bargain between myselff and the prosecuting attorney.

The premises,

duties and provisions off this plea bargain, iff any, are fully
contained in this statement.
15.

I know and understand that iff I desire to withdraw my

piea(s) off guilty and there is a legal basis to do so, I mus- file
a motion within thirty (30) days afft er enVr1/ ef
16.

I know

that

I

AL1J

any charge or sentencing

{sie^t*
concession or

recommendation off probation or suspended sentence, including a
reduction off the charges ffor sentencing made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding en the
Judge.

I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what

they believe the Court may do are also not binding on the Court.
17.

No threats, coercion/ or unlawful influence of any kind

have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except
those contained in this statement, have been made to me.
18.

I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me

by my attorney, and I understand its provisions.

I know that I am

free to change or delete anything contained in this statement.

I

do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are
correct.
19.
attorney.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my

-62Q.
the

I am 3>3>

years of age; I have attended school thrcugn

/(/? grade and I can read and understand the English language,

or an interpreter has been provided to me.
influence

I was not under tne

of any drugs, medication or intoxicants

which wculd

impair ay judgment when the decision was made to enter the piea(s) .
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication cr
intoxicants which impair my judgment.
21.
mentally

I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind,
capable

of

understanding

the

proceedings

and

the

consequences of my plea, and free of any mental disease, defect ::
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently anc
voluntarily entering my plea.
piea v

:iiis_2_day at De,
Dated thi<
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney fcr L )?a

(jC^1^

'

'

the defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement
or that I have read it to him/her and I have discussed it with
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning cf
its contents and is mentally and physically competent.

To the best

of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the
elements

of

the

crime (s)

and

the

factual

synopsis

of

the

defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along
with

the

other

representations

and

declarations

made

by

defendant in the foregoing affidavit/ are accurate and true.

tffORNEY FCR DEFENDANT /EAR #

the

-7CSRTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the
case against f\£*
'nALutCl
I have
t defendant.
reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual
basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats
or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered defendant. The
plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the
attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence
would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for
which the plea(s) is/are entered and the acceptance of the pleats)
would serve the public interest.

ORDER
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and
the certification of the defendant and counsel, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds the defendant's pleats) of guilty is
freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the
defendant's pleats) of guilty to the char^e(s) set forth in the
Statement be accepted and entei
Dated tehla 7
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ISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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